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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
the development of the doctrine of agency, i. e., that one should
be liable for the acts of another subject to his control and for
his benefit.
The instrumentality theory has already been distinguished
from what might be called the "fraudulent purpose" theory.
6. A final possibility for holding the parent liable exists when
the subsidiary is inactive, a mere sham, existing in name only.
It seems clear that if the parent acts in the name of the sub-
sidiary in such situations to avoid liability, it will be held liable
for any obligations incurred. All of the factors lettered "c" in
the chart are evidence of this situation. The outstanding example
of a case of this sort is number 53, Auglaize Box Board Co. v.
Hinton.
VI.
The above theories have been suggested by the writers on the
subject rather than by the courts. Sometimes the courts men-
tion in their opinions one or another of the various theories,
but for the most part they do not attempt to analyze their cases
and base their decisions on any one logical theory. Their opin-
ions are thus as vague and conflicting as their actual decisions.
At the present time, therefore, we can only say with Justice
Cardozo that "the whole problem of parent and subsidiary
corporations is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor.""7
ROBERT W. YOST '36.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE-WHEN IS A FOREIGN CAUSE
OF ACTION BARRED BY LIMITATIONS IN MISSOURI?-*
In the December, 1935, number of the St. Louis Law Review,
there appeared a note by John H. Haley of the Class of 1936 on
the subject "When is a Foreign Cause of Action Barred by Limi-
tations in Missouri?" In that note Mr. Haley had occasion to
criticize adversely the decision of Judge Reeves of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri in
the case of Wright v. New York Underwriters Insurance Com-
pany.' In the Wright case it was held by the court that when
an original action was commenced in Missouri on a foreign cause
of action, within the time allowed therefor by the law of the
state in which it originated, then the requirements of R. S. Mo.
27 (1926) 244 N. Y. 1. c. 94.
* Compare the views expressed in this supplementary note, with those
stated in Note, 21 St. Louis Law Rev. 43.
1 (1933) 1 Fed. Supp. 663.
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1929, sec. 8692 were satisfied; and if subsequently the plaintiff
in the original action suffered a non-suit, his right to commence
a new suit on the same cause of action in Missouri was governed
by R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 874.1 The reader is referred to Mr. Haley's
note for the grounds of his adverse criticism.4  On similar
grounds, Mr. Haley criticized adversely the opinion of Judge
Bland of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Christner v.
C., R. I & P. Ry. Co.,5 but was of the opinion that the expression
of Judge Bland upon the point in question appeared from the
facts stated to have been dictum in that case.6
Denton Dunn, of the Kansas City Bar, an alumnus of the
School of Law, happens to have been counsel for the plaintiff in
the Wright case and to have won that case on the theory criticized
by Mr. Haley. Judge Dunn has submitted a documented criticism
of Mr. Haley's objection. A precis of Judge Dunn's defence of
the holding in the Wright case is here appended as a supplement
to Mr. Haley's note of December, 1935.
"I cannot agree that the adoption of sec. 869 has changed the
rule of operation of sec. 874, which allows a year after non-suit
or dismissal for the refiling of a new suit on the same cause of
action. Sec. 869 is merely a part of the Missouri lex fori, and
thus is subject to sec. 874. The lex fori applies to the renewal
of suits which were once timely brought under limitation laws,
and the Missouri law is therefore the applicable law to the re-
newal of suits in Missouri on foreign causes of action, once they
have been timely brought.7
"The decision of McCoy v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co.,8 holding that
sec. 874 did not apply to foreign causes of action sued upon in
Missouri was erroneously decided, and is now overruled by
2Laws of Missouri (1899) page 300. "Whenever a cause of action has
been fully barred by the laws of the state, territory or country in which it
originated, said bar shall be a complete defence to any action thereon in
any of the courts of this state."
3 Laws of Missouri (1855) Ch. 103, Art. c, sec. 3, page 1051. "If any
action shall have been commenced within the times respectively prescribed
in the preceding articles, and the plaintiff therein suffer a non-suit, or
after verdict for him, the judgment be arrested, or after judgment for him,
the same be reversed on appeal or error, such plaintiff may commence a new
action from time to time, within one year after such non-suit suffered orjudgment arrested or reversed."
4See 21 St. Louis Law Rev. pp. 46-49.
5 (1933) 228 Mo. App. 220, 64 S. W. (2nd) 757.
6See 21 St. Louis Law Rev. on p. 48-9.
7 Mr. Haley's contention is, however, that in construing such a statute as
sec. 869, the courts hold that for the purposes of suit in Missouri on foreign
causes of action, the statute incorporates into the law of the forum the
statutes of limitation of the state where the cause of action arose, and in
applying them are merely applying the law of the forum, i. e., the law of
Missouri. (Editor.)
8 (1909) 134 Mo. App. 622, 114 S. W. 1124.
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Christner v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co.9 Nor is the Christner case
dictum, as stated by the author of the note, because inquiry re-
veals that the first suit was filed within a few weeks after the
cause of action arose, rather than two years and five months after
it arose, as the reports show.
"The case of Handlin v. Burchett'0 is not the last controlling
decision of the Missouri Supreme Court upon the question here
involved, because that case merely held that the Iowa statute,
which the defendant had invoked as a bar to the action under
the Iowa law, did not apply in the case, and that the trial court
was in error in holding that the action was barred by limitations.
Thus Handlin v. Burchett had nothing to do with the question
relating to the filing of a new suit in Missouri on a foreign cause
of action after the plaintiff had suffered a non-suit in a prior
action which had been timely brought. Incidentally, the attor-
neys for the defendant in Wright v. New York Underwriters
Insurance Co.- cited Handlin v. Burchett but stated: 'the precise
question (i. e. the one involved in the Wright case) has appar-
ently not been decided in this state,' and 'It is conceded that the
foregoing Missouri Supreme Court decisions do not pass directly
upon the precise point involved in the case at bar.'
"It appears, therefore, that the Federal District Court which
decided the Wright case was not bound to follow the case of
Handlin v. Burchett, which did not decide the point in con-
troversy. Nor was the court bound to follow the McCoy decision,
because the decisions of intermediate state courts are not bind-
ing on the Federal Courts. 1 2
9 Footnote 5, above.
10 (1917) 270 Mo. 114, 192 S. W. 1016.
1 Footnote 1, above.
12 Hudson v. Maryland Casualty Co. (C. C. A., 8th 1927) 22 Fed. (2nd)
791; Woods Bros. Const. Co. v. Yankton County (C. C. A., 8th 1931) 54
Fed. (2nd) 304; Federal Land Co. v. Swyers (C. C. A., 8th 1908) 161 Fed.
687.
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